In this paper we applied the parallel evolutionary strategy HGSNash to solving the decision making problem for water resource systems with external disagreement of interests. This problem is usually modelled as a non-cooperative strategic game. We define two different sets of water purifying cost functions for the water users and perform a simple experimental analysis. The efficiencies of HGSNash and others selected optimization methods were compared at the end of the paper.
INTRODUCTION
A water resource system can be defined as a system of methods of the water management in a given area. Some important decision problems connected with the system can be very difficult to solve, especially in the case of disagreement of the interests of the water users. The disagreement can be internal or external. The recent methodology of decision making in the case of internal disagreement of interests exploits decision support systems which enable to solve multi-criteria problems. The external disagreement of interests of the decision makers is usually modelled as a non-cooperative game with the Nash equilibrium as the solution (Wo niak, 1995) . This model can be used in practice because it does not oblige the decision makers to reveal their interests and it does not impose the centralized manner of the decision making. The Nash equilibria can be interpreted as steady states of a strategic game, in which each player holds correct expectations concerning the other players behavior (Straffin, 2004) . The problem of finding such equilibria points of the strategic games remains a challenging global optimization task. Algorithms for solving games have been studied from the beginning of game theory but usually they are very time consuming. HGSNash strategy applied in this paper is an evolutionary optimization method based on the Hierarchical Genetic Strategy (HGS) introduced by Kołodziej et al . The experimental analysis presented in this paper is a continuation of the research initialized in . We defined a new set of water purifying cost functions for the water users. These functions define the case of better cost amortization in consequence of partial effluents recycling. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 contain the problem definition and the main idea of HGSNash. Results of performed numerical experiments are reported in section 4. The paper ends with some final remarks.
DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM FOR WATER RESOURCE SYSTEM
Let us consider that many water users pour their effluents in the common sewage treatment plant. A tax for the emission of effluents can be the reason of the disagreement of interests of the users. The strategy decision variable of the user can be defined as the current pollution level of his effluents poured in the sewage treatment plant. The goal of the each user is to minimize the costs connected with the responsibility for the pollution of the natural environment. The cost function of the i-th user can be defined in the following way:
where:
• The p i function is defined as follows:
The values of parameters α i , 0 i p and q are estimated by the water resource management. These parameters are optimal for the users if the following condition is satisfied:
It was shown in (Petrosian and Zacharow, 1986 ) that parameters α i , 0 i p and q should be estimated according to the following rules:
There exists an unique optimal solution satisfying those conditions. To find this solution we use the theory of non-cooperative games and the concept of the Nash equilibrium formulated in terms of the global minimization of the multi-cost function Q: S 1 × … × S n →R defined in the following way:
• N = {1,...,n } is the set of players,
• S 1 ,…, S n ; (card(S i ) ≤ 2; i ∈N) are sets of strategies for the players,
players cost functions,
..,n. The problem of the optimal estimation of these parameters is the main task for the management of the water resource system. The optimal solution for this problem should imply the optimal decisions of users, which decrease the values of their cost functions. The game cost function has non-negative values and its global minimum is zero. The minimizing procedure for that function is composed of two cooperated units:
• Main unit -which solves the problem of the global minimization of the Q function,
• Subordinate unit -which solves the problems of the minimization of the users cost functions Q i . We need to minimize the cost functions of the users in the subordinate unit to compute the values of the cost function Q. We usually define a non-gradient optimization algorithm such as Powell algorithm for that unit. The gradient computation for the function Q is impossible in many cases. Thus the non-gradient global optimization algorithms such as Powell, modified Controlled Random Search or evolutionary algorithms could be recommended as the main a unit algorithms. We applied Hierarchical Genetic Strategy (HGS) Kołodziej, 2001) as the main mechanism of the optimization process of the game cost function Q.
THE MAIN IDEA OF HGSNash
HGSNash, introduced in , is a parallel evolutionary strategy designed for the detection of the Nash equilibria as the solutions of the noncooperative games. It is based on the Hierarchical Genetic Strategy (HGS). HGS is a very effective tool in solving ill-possed global optimization problems with multimodal and weakly convex objective functions (Kołodziej, 2001) . High efficiency of the strategy comes from the concurrent search in the optimization landscape by many small populations. The sequences of these populations are defined as the evolutionary dependent processes. HGS was successfully applied as a method of solving some practical engineering problems, for example for the estimation of the geometric errors of the Coordinate Measure Machine (Kołodziej et al, 2004) . HGSNash can be defined as a simple adaptation of the Hierarchical Genetic Strategy (HGS) to the global optimization of the multi-cost game function Q defined by the formula (3). This adaptation requires a modification of the main evolutionary mechanism in HGS due to the parallel structure of the multi-cost function optimization procedure (see Fig. 1 ). As the subordinate unit in HGSNash we applied the Powell non-gradient optimization algorithm. The main unit algorithm in HGSNash is depended on the HGS implementation type. We apply the binary HGS with Simple Genetic Algorithm (SGA) as the evolutionary mechanism in the case of the binary HGSNash implementation and the floating point HGS with Simple Evolutionary Algorithm (SEA) in the case of HGSNash real implementation. We define SEA algorithm as (µ,µ)-ES with Gaussian mutation and proportionate selection. SEA is also called Evolutionary Search with Soft Selection (ESSS) in some papers (Galar, 1885) . A fixed number of iterations of HGSNash defines a metaepoch of the given period. The rough scheme of the k-periodic metaepoch procedure is presented on Figure  1 .
All genetic operators defined originally for HGS, i.e. sprouting operator and prefix comparison operator (see Schaefer and Kołodziej, 2002) and (Wierzba te al, 2003) for details) can be applied also in HGSNash. Figure 2 shows the example structure of binary implementation HGS after running of 3 metaepochs.
In this paper HGSNash with SEA as the evolutionary mechanism was applied to solve the decision-making tasks for the systems with external disagreement of interests. We performed some numerical experiments and compared their results with the results of some similar tests obtained for the single population SEA and ACRS PW algorithm specially designed for Nash equilibria detection ( lepowro ska, 1996) .
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we reported the results of some simple numerical experiments performed for the verification of the efficiency of HGSNash in solving the decisionmaking problem of water resource system. We solved that problem for two different variants of the users water purifying functions and three groups of input parameters values. The HGSNash performance was compared with other selected optimization methods like a single population evolutionary strategy and modified Advanced Controlled Random Search as the main unit algorithms in the 2-steps Nash detection procedure ( lepowro ska, 1996 ) .
Test suite
Let us assume that there are only two water users. We considered two variants of the users water purifying cost functions.
Case 1 In the first case we assumed that the users costs of the water purifying increase proportionally to the current pollution levels of water poured in the sewage treatment plant. For the first user those costs increase two times faster than for the second one. The water purifying functions in this case are defined by the following formulas:
Case 2 In the second case we changed the cost water purifying function for the second user from linear to the quadratic one. Now the values of water purifying cost for that user, small in the beginning, can grow very fast and exceed the first user's costs, which was impossible in the previous case. The water purifying functions in this case are defined by the following formulas:
The plots of those functions are presented on the All experiments were performed for three different sets of the input parameters values.
Note that in this case the cost of water purifying is low for both users.
Set 2
In this case we have exchanged the coefficients in the tax rates and we changed the capacity of effluence poured by the users. These changes should show the significant differences in the users behavior.
Set 3
In the last case we again exchanged the coefficients in the tax rates. The capacity of effluence is greater than the maximal pollution level set for both users.
Parameter setting
We applied 3-levels HGSNash strategy for solving the test problems defined in the previous section. The 3-levels floating point HGS (Wierzba et al, 2003) was defined as the main unit algorithm in HGSNash structure. The genetic operations in SEA were reduced to the Gaussian mutation with the standard deviation defined as a mutation parameter. We considered two cases of the evaluation of small and big populations on every HGSwithSEA level. The values of parameters for the 3-levels HGSwithSEA in both cases are presented in Tables 1 and 2 . The Powell optimization algorithm was defined as the subordinate unit algorithm in HGSNash. We accepted the maximal number of metaepochs executed in the single run (which was 500 in every experiment) as the stop criterion. The HGSNash performance was compared with the following algorithms:
• single population SEA with Gaussian mutation and no crossover, • Advanced Controlled Random Search Algorithm with Powell method -ACRS PW ACRS PW algorithm was introduced in ( lepowro ska, 1996) as a hybrid method of Nash equilibria detection for non-cooperative games. The main unit algorithm in ACRS PW is based on two-steps optimization method with Controlled Random Search (CRS) algorithm in the first step and Powell method in the second step. The main goal of the CRS algorithm is to indicate some neighborhoods of the potential solutions, in which the Powell method could be started (see lepowro ska, 1996) for details). The subordinate unit algorithm in ACRS PW is also Powell algorithm. The values of initial parameters for SEA algorithm in cases of small and big populations are presented in Table 3 . We accepted the value of the mutation parameter defined for the most accurate process in HGSNash as the mutation parameter value for SEA. The population size values in SEA correspond to the sum of the values of those parameters on all levels of HGSNash. The stop criterion for that algorithm was defined as a maximal number of iterations, which was 50000 in all experiments.
The values of the initial parameters for ACRS PW are presented in Table 4 . The optimal number of start points for CRS algorithm was set to n…25 (n is the number of objective function variables) according to the W.L. Price experimental studies (Price, 1983) . The search accuracy parameter ε is the maximal possible value of the objective function at the points detected by CRS as the potential solutions. The maximal number of iterations of the CRS algorithm was 1000 in every experiment. The search accuracy γ parameter is the radius of the neighborhood of the proper solution found by the Powell algorithm in the second step. The γ parameter defines the termination condition for the whole algorithm.
Results of the experiments
Each experiment was repeated 30 times for all algorithms. Tables 5-9 report experimental results obtained in two cases of users water purifying cost function and three sets of users total cost functions parameters i=1, 2; j=1, 2, 3) . In tables 5 and 6 we compare the efficiency in finding the global optimum in cases of small and big populations. In the case of ACRS PW we define as the "population" the number of initial points for CRS step. "Small population" for that algorithm contained 10 initial points while "big population" -50. The parameter (nr) means the number of runs of the particular algorithms, in which the global optimum was found. We assumed the value of the objective function in optimal solutions should be not greater than 0,005. In what follows we will report the results only for evolutionary algorithms with small populations and ACRS PW with 50 initial points.
In tables 7 and 8 we present the best solutions found by three applied algorithms and the average time (in seconds) needed for such results. The obtained results show that HGSNash is the fastest method and can find the Nash equilibrium in each case. SEA is about 2 times slower than HGSNash. It could not find the global optimum in 2 cases. ACRS PW is also very slow and in some cases could find the Nash point.
In the end we compared the average fitness evaluations for the evolutionary algorithms. The results are reported in table 9. 
